October 19, 2009
Yup, you read that right. Diebold scanners are picky about which color ink is used to mark a ballot — sometimes just can not read blue ink. Also, sometimes just can not read marks made with number two pencil. Everyone who has ever filled out a scantron sheet for an SAT or GRE or any other standardized test must be scratching your head by now.
Yes, I know, I know … the official instructions from Diebold say to use a number two pencil or a pen with blue or black ink (just like those standardized test directions). But you can’t believe the official stuff because it doesn’t always work. Read the rest of this entry »
September 7, 2009
In honor of the planned union of the number one and number two voting machine companies (ES&S and Diebold), I give you the Voting Machine Song … a lyrical message from the Diebold-Halliburton Fund for the Promotion of Democracy, sung by Marilyn Bennett, Doug Smith, Nkemjika Ofodile and James Garland.
January 14, 2008
…And the rest of us will find out via a recount in New Hampshire. Because Diebold won’t tell.
The paper ballots hold the key.
I have said before and I will say it again here — paper ballots are not enough to ensure election integrity and transparency. You’ve got to do something with the paper to check the election results — like a mandatory routine audit. If New Hampshire had a law on the books requiring a post-election audit we would not be in the ignominious position of
- first, begging for a candidate, any candidate, to step forward and ask for a recount and,
- second, scrambling around to help raise funds to pay the thousands of dollars it costs to recount all the ballots even in a small state like New Hampshire.
We are grateful that Democrat Kucinich and Republican Howard have stepped forward to help find answers the burning questions: Who really won the primary — and, could the vote have been hacked? Read the rest of this entry »
January 11, 2008
The internet has been abuzz since Tuesday night with wild claims that Hillary Clinton “hacked” the NH Primary — or that someone else perpetrated the dirty deed to help Clinton and McCain triumph in the Granite State. Some point to differences between the margins in hand-counted precincts vs. optical scan precincts. Others claim that the pre-election polling could not be so far off from reported results.
Both of these cries of “fraud”, and “hacking” are based on flawed logic — and stunning ignorance or basic misunderstanding of statistics. They also fail to look at the demographic make-up of precincts that produced different margins for the candidates. On the other hand, there has been an almost universal failure to consider whether well-documented problems with the type of optical scan machine used in New Hampshire offers at least a partial explanation of how this happened. Read the rest of this entry »
December 29, 2007
Colorado SOS Michael Coffman completed court mandated testing and recertification of voting systems used in the state and issued some dramatic rulings which were immediately subject to a firestorm of controversy.
Premier (formally known as Diebold) All voting equipment submitted for recertification passed.
Sequoia The optical scan devices, Insight and 400-C, used to count paper ballots both passed, but the electronic voting machines, the Edge II and the Edge II Plus, both failed due to a variety of security risk factors, including that the system is not password protected, has exposed controls potentially giving voters unauthorized access, and lacks an audit trail to detect security violations.
Hart The optical scan devices, eScan and BallotNow, both failed because test results showed that they could not accurately count ballots. The electronic voting machine, eSlate, passed.
ES&S The optical scan devices (M 100 and the M650) both failed because of an inability to determine if the devices work correctly and an inability to complete the testing threshold of 10,000 ballots due to vendor programming errors. The electronic voting machine (iVotronic) failed because it is easily disabled by voters activating the device interface, and the system lacks an audit trail to detect security violations.